

Message Text

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OES - MR. NOSENZO
ACDA - MR. VAN DOREN
PM - MR. OPLINGER '
NSC - MR. THORNTON
ERDA - MR. SIEVERING
S/S-O:TGMARTIN
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 172366

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, IN

SUBJECT: STRATEGY FOR NYE VISIT

1. WE SEE THIS ROUND OF DISCUSSIONS AS PRIMARILY EDUCA-
TIONAL TO CARRY FORWARD ON BROADER SCALE AND IN GREATER
DEPTH THE EXPLANATION OF U.S. NUCLEAR POLICY AND ITS IMPLI-
CATIONS FOR INDO-U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION THAT WAS BEGUN
DURING THE JUNE 10 MEETING BETWEEN JOE NYE AND FOREIGN
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SECRETARY MEHTA IN LONDON. AT THIS STAGE WE DO NOT PROPOSE
COMMENCING FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DETAILED NUCLEAR
AGENDA PROVIDED TO THE INDIANS PER STATE 118926. FOR THE
PRESENT WE WOULD APPEAR TO BE BETTER OFF TACTICALLY BY CON-
TINUING TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON THE MAJOR POLICY ISSUES AD-
DRESSED AT LONDON AND PREVIOUSLY RAISED WITH THE INDIANS
BY EMBASSY DELHI. IF THESE ARE RESOLVED IN A SATISFACTORY

MANNER, THE TECHNICAL QUESTIONS AND DETAILS SHOULD FALL INTO PLACE EVEN THOUGH WE RECOGNIZE THIS MAY INVOLVE EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE INDIANS. IN OTHER WORDS, OUR GOAL ON THE INDIA TRIP SHOULD BE TO DO WHAT FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA SUGGESTED TO NYE, TO ALLEVIATE "APPREHENSIONS OR MISAPPREHENSIONS" ABOUT U.S. POLICY.

2. IN TERMS OF THE PRESENTATION ON POLICY ISSUES, WE ASSUME NYE AND CO. IN DELHI WILL BE MEETING WITH MEHTA, ADDITIONAL

FOREIGN SECRETARY VELLODI AND CABINET SECRETARY SHANKAR, WHOM AMBASSADOR GOHEEN SAW IN LATE MAY WHEN THE EMBASSY FIRST PRESENTED OUR NUCLEAR AGENDA. IN ADDITION, IF THE EMBASSY BELIEVES IT USEFUL, NYE WOULD OF COURSE BE PREPARED TO EXPLAIN OUR POLICIES TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND ALSO THE PRIME MINISTER, POSSIBLY IN HIS CAPACITY AS MINISTER FOR ATOMIC ENERGY AFFAIRS. IN BOMBAY WE ARE ASSUMING NYE WILL MAKE AN ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR PRESENTATION TO INDIAN ATOMIC ENERGY CHAIRMAN SETHNA AND HIS SENIOR STAFF.

3. ON THE POLICY SIDE, OUR APPROACH WILL REMAIN ROUGHLY ALONG THE LINES OUTLINED FOR MEHTA. (A) REVIEW THE GENERAL THRUST OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S APPROACH ON NUCLEAR AND ARMS CONTROL MATTERS AND PERTINENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS; (B) REITERATE THE INVITATION FOR INDIA TO JOIN INFCEP AND CONFIDENTIAL

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USE THIS AS A CONVENIENT PEG TO EXPLAIN OUR STANCE TOWARD REPROCESSING AND BREEDERS. ONE POSSIBLE WAY UNDER INFCEP TO REDUCE THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY OUR REFUSAL TO AGREE TO A JOINT DETERMINATION ON SAFEGUARDABILITY OF THE TARAPUR REPROCESSING PLANT WOULD BE TO USE THIS FACILITY TO EXPERIMENT WITH THE TANDEM FUEL CYCLE PROCESS. WE PLAN TO ELABORATE ON THIS TO SETHNA AND CO. (C) EXPLAIN OUR HOPE THAT INDIA WILL ADOPT THE LONDON SUPPLIERS GROUP GUIDELINES AS THE BASIS FOR ITS OWN CONTROLS ON EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY. (D) REVIEW IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL THE COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE, TRYING TO ALLEVIATE INDIAN CONCERNS THAT THESE WOULD BE EITHER DISCRIMINATORY OR IMPAIR INDIA'S ABILITY TO USE NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR ECONOMIC OR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS THE KEY ISSUE BEFORE US - AND THE INDIANS-AND ARE ACCORDINGLY TROUBLED THAT PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION AND PRESS COMMENTARY IN INDIA DURING THE PAST MONTH APPEARS TO HAVE MADE THIS A MORE POLITICALLY CONTROVERSIAL QUESTION THAN WAS PREVIOUSLY THE CASE. HOWEVER, WE SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO FACING THE SAFEGUARDS ISSUE SQUARELY. (E) FILL THE INDIANS IN ON THE STATUS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN DISCUSSIONS. (F) ON INDIAN TEST-

ING, THERE IS NOT MUCH MORE WE NEED TO SAY IN VIEW OF DESAI'S EMPHATIC STATEMENTS. WE PROBABLY WILL REITERATE AT SOME POINT THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER FURTHER TESTING WOULD RESULT IN A TARAPUR FUEL SUPPLY CUTOFF. IN THE TESTING AREA, OUR GOAL IS NOW TO PIN DOWN DESAI'S STAND ON A LONGER-TERM BASIS BY TRYING TO POSITION INDIA FOR ADHERENCE TO A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN ARRANGEMENT.

4. ONE POINT OF IMPORTANCE RELATES TO THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED RPT INCREASED U.S. COOPERATION WITH INDIA IN THE NUCLEAR AREA SHOULD THEY AGREE TO FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

WE ARE UNSURE HOW BEST TO PLAY THIS CARD AND WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS. OUR INCLINATION IS TO AVOID STRESSING THIS
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DURING THE DISCUSSIONS IN DELHI, ESPECIALLY IF THERE IS A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, BUT TO GET THE POINT ACROSS TO SETHNA AND HIS IAEC PEOPLE. OUR RATIONALE IS THAT THOSE IN DELHI WILL BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ISSUES OF "PRINCIPLE" (I.E. WHETHER THERE IS DISCRIMINATION/ TECHNICAL DISADVANTAGE INVOLVED WITH ACCEPTANCE OF COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS) WHILE THE INDIAN AEC WILL BE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES FROM INDIA'S BEING ABLE TO IMPORT NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT/TECHNOLOGY FROM THE U.S., CANADA AND OTHER SOURCES THAT ARE CURRENTLY DE FACTO BARRED BECAUSE OF INDIAN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

5. ON THE SO-CALLED TECHNICAL ISSUES OUTLINED IN STATE 118926, OUR INCLINATION IS NOT TO TRY TO SEEK SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS FROM THE INDIANS, BUT TO RAISE THESE ITEMS PRIMARILY IN BOMBAY TO ASSURE THAT THE INDIANS REALIZE WE HAVE NOT FORGOTTEN (A) THE CIRUS AND RAPP I HEAVY WATER QUESTIONS, AND (B) OUR DESIRE THAT SAFEGUARDS BE MAINTAINED ON THE TARAPUR PLANT SHOULD WE CEASE FUEL SUPPLY. THE RAPP I QUESTION IS OF COURSE CURRENTLY EXTREMELY RELEVANT SINCE THE INDIANS APPEAR TO BE STONEWALLING ON INCLUSION OF RAPP I UNDER SAFEGUARDS IN THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IAEA OVER SAFEGUARDS ON RUSSIAN HEAVY WATER. THE OTHER TECHNICAL QUESTION RELATES TO THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF TARAPUR SPENT FUEL. HOPEFULLY THE GE CONSULTANTS WILL BE IN PLACE BY THE TIME THE TEAM VISITS TARAPUR SINCE THEIR PRESENCE WOULD BE USEFUL WHEN NYE AND CO. ARE THERE.

6. LOOKING AHEAD, OUR TENTATIVE TIMETABLE ON NUCLEAR DISCUSSIONS IS AS FOLLOWS:

-- INVITE THE INDIANS FOR A FOLLOW-ON ROUND OF TALKS IN
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THE U.S. IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER.

-- DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE DURING THE LIKELY EARLY OCTOBER BILATERAL AT THE UNGA BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER.

-- MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION DURING THE BILATERAL TALKS THAT WILL TAKE PLACE IF THE SECRETARY VISITS INDIA IN DECEMBER. PRESUMABLY THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM WILL BE ONE OF THE MAJOR ITEMS ON HIS AGENDA.

7. SINCE THE NEXT TARAPUR SHIPMENT DECISION SHOULD BE MADE SOMETIME ABOUT FEBRUARY-MARCH, 1978, THIS TIMETABLE SHOULD GIVE US A FAIR IDEA OF WHERE WE ARE HEADING ON

NUCLEAR TALKS BY THE END OF 1977.

8. REGARDING A PRESS LINE FOR THE NYE VISIT WHICH WAS MENTIONED DURING DEPARTMENTAL PRESS BACKGROUNDER FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S TRIP, WE THINK THE BEST APPROACH IS TO TALK OF THIS AS PART OF A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH INDIANS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS AND TO BE VAGUE ABOUT THE SPECIFICS. WE SUGGEST YOU COORDINATE THIS WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY MEHTA, ALSO INDICATING THAT WE SEE NO NEED OR DESIRABILITY FOR NYE AND CO. TO BE IN CONTACT WITH THE PRESS DURING THE VISIT.

9. WE WOULD WELCOME FOLLOWING FROM DELHI/BOMBAY:

(A) COMMENTS/SUGGESTIONS ON APPROACH OUTLINED ABOVE AS WELL AS DETAILS ON SCHEDULE AS THESE ARE DEVELOPED.

(B) AN UPDATE AS APPROPRIATE ON BILL COURTNEY'S EXCELLENT ANALYSIS IN BOMBAY 1192.

(C) ANY INSIGHTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THE POLITICS OF NON-CONFIDENTIAL

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PROLIFERATION IN INDIA AS THESE RELATE TO OUR FORTHCOMING DISCUSSIONS.

(D) THE ATTITUDE OF DESAI GOVERNMENT TOWARD THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM. DOES THIS DIFFER FROM THE APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN BY THE GANDHI GOVERNMENT AS REFLECTED IN THEIR OFFICIAL EXCHANGES WITH THE U.S.?

10. YOUR REPLY TO PARAGRAPH 9 SHOULD BE CABLED TO PARIS -
ATTENTION SCIENCE COUNSELOR FOR NYE AS WELL AS TO THE
DEPARTMENT BY JULY 26
VANCE

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Message Attributes

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